About the author
Antony
Penaud <antonypenaud@yahoo.fr> obtained a DPhil from Somerville
College, University of Oxford, UK, in 2000. He is French and lives in London.
National identities in Ukraine and in Euromaidan
INTRODUCTION
In this
essay, we are going to document and highlight the different identities in
Ukraine.
Much has
already been said on language (Russophobes in Ukraine), and here we are going
to focus on historical narrative.
We are
going to show that the different identities can be seen geographically, and on
the electoral map.
We are
going to focus particularly on Western Ukraine (where Ukrainian nationalism is
the strongest).
We will
also highlight the role of nationalism in Euromaidan, and its representation in
the post Yanukovich government.
The plan
for our essay is the following:
1. Political
and identical map in short
2.
Historical narratives
3.
Svoboda
4.
Euromaidan
5. What
came out of Euromaidan
1. POLITICAL AND IDENTICAL MAP IN
SHORT
Main
political parties
The two
main political parties in recent Ukrainian history have been
- The
Party of Regions: it was led by Yanukovich who is from the Donetsk region
(Donbass, part of Eastern Ukraine), and in short it is seen as the party
protecting Russophobes and willing closer ties with Russia.
-
Fatherland: Yushchenko was president of Ukraine before 2010 and member of the
Our Ukraine party which was ideollogicaly close to Fatherland. Our Ukraine is
now dissolved. Tymoshchenko is Fatherland's leader and was PM under Yushchenko.
Yatseniuk belongs to this party and supported Yushchenko in the past. In short,
Fatherland can be seen as the opposite as the Party of Regions.
Extremes
Because
we want to focus national identities, we introduce the far right and the far
left:
- Svoboda
(far right nationalist party, electoral base in Western Ukraine - we have a
full section about it later).
- The
Communist Party (Soviet identity and anti-nationalist in short, strongest
scores in the South and in the East).
Again, to
summarise: in a second round of presidential elections between the Party of
Region and Fatherland, Svoboda sympathisers would vote for Fatherland and
Communist Party sympathisers would vote for the Party of Regions.
2nd round
of the 2010 presidential elections
The
electoral map of the 2010 presidential elections shows a clear and strong
separation: in the South and the East (where there are more Russophones and
people who want closer ties with Russia), Yanukovich had more votes in every
region. In particular, in the Donbass (Lugansk region and Donetsk region) Yanukovych
had more than 80%, and in some parts more than 90%.
On the
other hand, Timoshenko had her best scores (near 90%) in the West of Ukraine,
in particular in the L’viv region.
These
patterns can be found in previous presidential elections too (see electoral
maps at the end).
Svoboda
and the Communist Party
In the
first round of the 2010 elections both parties did not do well:
-
Svaboda's score was 1.43% nationally (its highest score was 5.35% in the L’viv
region, but interestingly it did 34.98% in another Western Ukraine region in
the local elections later that year, which might mean that Svoboda sympathisers
vote for the Fatherland party in presidential elections).
- The
Communists Party's score was 3.5% nationally.
In the
2012 parliamentary elections both parties made much higher scores:
- Svaboda's
national score was 10.44%. In the L’viv region (L’viv is the largest city in
Western Ukraine) it did 38.01%. It made a breakthrough in Kiev with 17.33%. Its
lowest scores were in Crimea (1.05%), and in the Donbass (around 1.25%).
- The
Communist Party's national score was 13.2%. It was 25.14% in the Lugansk region
(one of the two regions of the Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) and 29.46% in
Sevastopol (home to the Russian naval base in Crimea). Its lowest score was in
one region of West Ukraine (1.78%).
Summary
To
summarise, Western Ukraine and the Donbass region (Eastern Ukraine) are at the
two extremes in terms of Ukrainian politics. The Centre of Ukraine is closer to
Western Ukraine while the remaining of the East and the South are closer to the
Donbass region.
Finally,
the extreme South of Western Ukraine is different from Western Ukraine (it was
not part of Poland before 1939), and Crimea was part of Russia until 1954 and
the majority of Crimean people identify themselves as Russians.
2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVES
In this
section we are going to tell the different historical narratives, with a focus
on Western Ukraine's historical narrative.
Western
Ukraine's different history in short
Western
Ukraine only became part of the USSR in 1939 following the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact (it was occupied by Germany after Operation Barbarossa in June 1941).
Before 1939 it was part of Poland, and before WW1 part of the Austro Hungarian
Empire. Unlike the rest of Ukraine, it is not Orthodox.
In other
words, Western Ukraine was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939. Many people
from Western Ukraine fought against the Red Army during the WW2 (and alongside
Nazi Germany), as opposed to other Ukrainians (see Katchanovski (1), Ottawa
University) .
2.1
Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
According
to Katchanovski, "in independent Ukraine, particularly since the Orange
Revolution of 2004, WW2 has become a major political battleground. There are
significant divisions concerning policies, views, definitions, and
commemoration of this conflict in comtemporary Ukraine".
2.1.1 Why
the revival of national myths in Ukraine should alarm us
Below, we
cite extracts of the 19 May 2014 article Why the Revival of National Myths in
Ukraine Should Alarm Us (2) by Amar (Assistant Professor in History at Columbia
University) and Rudling (Associate Professor in History at Lund University,
Sweden):
"Historian
Omer Bartov has long pointed out a fundamental problem which substantial parts
of Ukrainian society, in and outside Ukraine, still find hard to acknowledge:
it is not possible to glorify ethnic nationalists as freedom-fighting heroes
and examples for today and, at the same time, to be honest about their
anti-Semitism, ethnic and political mass violence, and collaboration with Nazi
Germany. It is true that this collaboration was less extensive than what it
could have been, had Nazi Germany accepted the Ukrainian nationalists as allies
the way it did with Slovakian and Croatian ones. Moreover, some Ukrainian
nationalists also periodically clashed with the Germans and were persecuted by
them. Yet there is no doubt or room for argument about a simple fact: the
record of Ukrainian WW2 nationalism includes massive, politically motivated,
and deliberate violence against civilians, including participation in the
Holocaust and the mass-murderous ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of
Poles.(...)
Seeking
ideological hegemony for this mythical version of history in today's Ukraine,
it was, in fact, Yushchenko who, ironically, also helped spread a stereotype
equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian nationalists. In reality, the Organization
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),
controlled by the Bandera wing of the OUN, were – within the context of WW2 –
comparatively small and strongly regional organizations. Their massive, brutal effects
during the war did not reflect popular support throughout Ukraine but the
opportunities offered by the war and the nationalists' ruthless, premeditated
will to capitalize on them. In fact, far more Ukrainians fought against Nazi
Germany – as part of Soviet forces – than for Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. By
equating ethnic nationalists with the nation Yushchenko not only accepted the
nationalists’ own unfounded claims at face value. He also contributed to the
polarization of Ukraine. Moreover, for observers at home and abroad, he
burdened the image and substance of pro-western policies with a legacy of
authoritarianism and mass murder that is, in fact, irreconcilable with them. In
particular, his policies complicated Ukraine's relationship with Poland; it was
a Polish initiative, led by Members of the European Parliament from the
otherwise pro-Ukrainian "Platforma Obywatelska" party that finally
led to an EU protest against Yushchenko's most egregious provocations. Only
larger geopolitical interests ultimately outweighed these concerns: the
glorification of the violent legacy of ethnic nationalism went largely
unchallenged during the negotiations for the EU Association Agreement.(...)
While
Yushchenko no longer matters, his legacy of state glorification of ethnic
nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry or, perhaps, shed.
Volodymyr
Viatrovych, under Yushchenko director of the archives of the former KGB, is now
the head of Ukraine’s Institute of National Memory. He has long been a key proponent
of an uncritical and glorifying interpretation of the OUN and UPA. His
publications, often written for a broad audience and little known in the West –
but influential in Ukraine – have consistently downplayed the OUN's
anti-Semitism and the UPA's anti-Polish massacres. Viatrovych has also publicly
belittled the murder of civilians in Belarus by Ukrainian nationalists serving
there as German auxiliaries."
2.1.2 Geographical
divide
A poll
In a 2009
survey from the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), in Galicia
(the part of Western Ukraine with L’viv, Ternopil and Ivan--Frankivsk), 63% of
Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Bandera (of which 37% very
positive), 12% had a negative attitude (of which 6% very negative).
In the Centre of Ukraine, 13% had a positive attitude
towards Bandera (of which 3% was very positive), and 38% a negative attitude
(of which 21% was very negative).
In
Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Lugansk but also Kharkov, Dnipropetrovsk and
Zaporizhia), 2% had a positive attitude towards Bandera (of which 1% was very
positive) , and 59% a negative attitude (of which 46% was very negative).
In the South of
Ukraine, 1% had a positive attitude towards Bandera, and 45% a negative
attitude (of which 30% was very negative).
The view
of a Donbass resident
The
following 11 April 2014 interview (in Le Courrier de Russie) of a Donetsk
(Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) policeman summarises it all: "Here in the
Donbass, we have nothing in common with L’viv - the only thing that still unites
us, is the country. It was Vatutin [Soviet general in WW2] who liberated my city.
And six months later, he was assassinated by the soldiers of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army. Over there, in L’viv, their heroes are the people from the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army; but for me, Vatutin is the hero. That man who led the
Red Army and who freed my city from the fascists. What do we have in common
with L’viv people? We have a different History and a different culture."
2.2
Holodomor
2.2.1
Yushchenko
Amar and
Rudling wrote:
"During
Viatrovych first tenure as head of the SBU, he allied himself publicly with
Yushchenko's memory politics. The SBU presented an absurdly selective list of
"the" 19 people responsible for the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine. Two
fifths of the names on it were presented in the classically anti-Semitic
fashion of "decoding" family names by adding the "real"
Jewish name in parenthesis. Under his tenure, the SBU also produced an official
number of 10,063,000 million victims of the 1932-33 famine in the Ukrainian
SSR, a tripling of the consensus number by historical demographers. Such
manipulation of what are terrible figures anyhow is not a minor issue but
reflects a long-standing tendency to "compete" with the
Holocaust.".
2.2.2
Solzhenitsyn
A few
months before his death in August 2008, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (whose mother
was Ukrainian) wrote:
"
The great famine of 1921 shook our country, from the Urals, across the Volga,
and deep into European Russia. It cut down millions of our people. But the word
Holodomor [meaning murder by hunger] was not used at that time. The Communist
leadership deemed it sufficient to blame the famine on a natural drought, while
failing to mention at all the grain requisitioning that cruelly robbed the
peasantry.
And in
1932-33, when a similar great famine hit Ukraine and the Kuban region, the
Communist Party bosses (including quite a few Ukrainians) treated it with the
same silence and concealment. And it did not occur to anyone to suggest to the
zealous activists of the Communist Party and Young Communist League that what
was happening was the planned annihilation of precisely the Ukrainians. The
provocative outcry about "genocide" only began to take shape decades
later -- at first quietly, inside spiteful, anti-Russian, chauvinistic minds --
and now it has spun off into the government circles of modern-day Ukraine, who
have thus outdone even the wild inventions of Bolshevik agitprop.
To the
parliaments of the world: This vicious defamation is easy to insinuate into Western
minds. They have never understood our history: You can sell them any old fairy
tale, even one as mindless as this."
2.3
Memory politics (memory wars?)
2.3.1
Bandera
Hero of
Ukraine
Shortly
before the 2010 presidential elections, Yushchenko awarded to Bandera the title
of Hero of Ukraine. Later that year, under Yanukovych, a Donetsk court declared
unlawful that decree (3) (they argued Bandera only lived in the USSR, not in
the Ukrainian independent state).
Monuments
In 2010
and 2011, many Western Ukrainian cities named Bandera honorary citizen of their
city.
As far as
we know, there are 25 Bandera statues, 5 Bandera museums, and 14 Bandera
streets in Ukraine: all are recent, and all are in Western Ukraine.
The first
monument for the {\it victims} of the UIA and nationalists was erected in
Simferopol (Crimea) in 2007. In May 2010 in Lugansk (Eastern Ukraine), another
monument for the victims of the UIA and nationalists was erected (4). There is
another monument in Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine).
Outside
Ukraine, there are monuments to the victims of the UIA in Poland (tens of
thousands of thousands of Poles were ethnically cleansed by the UIA). In Canada
and the US, there are monuments honouring the UIA in cemeteries.
9 May
On 9 May
2011, for the celebration of the end of WW2 (because of the time difference it
is not celebrated on 8 May in post Soviet countries), a group of people
including WW2 veterans was attacked in L’viv by nationalists (5). That day Svoboda
members stormed the office of the regional administration (Mikhailo
Tsymbaliouk) and forced him to sign a resignation letter.
2.3.2
Holodomor
Yushchenko
Since
2006, Ukraine have a Holomodor memorial day (on 25 November). In 2007, there
was a 3-day commemoration in Kiev, and in 2008 a memorial was erected in Kiev.
In 2009,
Ukrainian schoolchildren took a more extensive course on the History of the
Holodomor, as well as on the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) (6).
Yanukovych
In 2010,
the new president Yanukovych visited the Holodomor memorial.
Earlier
that year he had stated in Strasbourg: "The Holodomor was in Ukraine,
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was the result of Stalin's totalitarian
regime. But it would be wrong and unfair to recognize the Holodomor as an act
of genocide against one nation".
The
Fatherland party reacted by stating "By his statement, Yanukovych directly
violated the norms of the Ukrainian law of November 28, 2006 on the Holodomor
of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, the first article of which clearly states: 'The
Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine is genocide against the Ukrainian
people.'" (7).
Summary
While
both main parties want to remember the Holodomor, they disagree on how to
remember it. Fatherland have exaggerated the number of victims and see it as a
genocide directed by Russians against Ukrainians, while the Party of Regions
insist the famine happened in other parts of the Soviet Union too.
2.4
Comments
Causality?
One
should note that Bandera and the UIA were essentially from the West of Ukraine,
and that in 1932-33 what we now call Western Ukraine was in Poland, and there
was therefore no famine there. Therefore, the UIA was not a consequence of the
famine, there was no causal relationship - they were unrelated. The East and
Centre of Ukraine were the most affected part of Ukraine.
Ukraine
unity
Beyond
the fact that the glorification of Bandera is morally questionable, many
Ukrainians in the South and the East of Ukraine do not see Bandera as a hero,
and on the contrary see him as a nazi collaborator. It seems logical that such
a choice for a national hero would not unify Ukrainians, but on the contrary
divide them. Bandera is quite simply a divisive figure in Ukraine.
Anti-Russian
There is
however a common factor between the UIA and the Holodomor. In both cases, the enemy
(from contemporary Ukrainian nationalists' point of view) is the Russians. This
is in fact historically not that simple: the UIA hated more the Poles than the
Russians ("they have an almost religious worship of their nation and
distrust anything foreign: first and foremost, Polish, then Russian; then
German" (8)) and Stalin was Georgian.
The role
of the EU (and the US)?
Also, we
think it worth pondering on the following sentence in the Amar and Rudling
article: {\it the glorification of the violent legacy of ethnic nationalism
went largely unchallenged during the negotiations for the EU Association
Agreement}. Indeed, it is possible that the EU (and the US) judged that it was
in their interest to encourage (or at least tolerate) strong nationalistic anti-Russian
sentiment in Ukrainian politics.
2.5 The
CIA's assessment on Bandera
Just
after the end of WW2, the US made a bond with Ukrainian nationalists: a CIA
declassified (under the Nazi war crimes disclosure act) document reads (9), CIA
declassified document.}:
"As
relations between the US and the Soviet Unions deteriorated, the CIA expanded
its ties with these émigrés (...).
many
Ukrainians despised Poles and Jews as well as Soviet Communists. Ukrainians
served in the German army and had been linked to Nazi atrocities on the Eastern
Front (...)
Bandera
led the largest faction of the OUN (which split when the war broke out), and
Melnik led the smaller one. Both factions participated in terrorist activities
against Polish officials before the war, and Ukrainian nationalists allied
themselves with their Nazi "liberators" during the first days of
Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Even though OUN's enthusiasm diminished after the
Nazis failed to support Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainians continued to fight
alongside the Germans until the end of the war.(...)
The
Soviet Union's demand for repatriating all its citizens suspected of war crimes
and collaboration with the Nazis complicated Aradi's and Holtman's work with
the Ukrainians while they established initial contacts with OUN and ZPUHVR.
American acquiescence with Soviet demand would damage relations with the
Ukrainians. At the same time, Nazis rounded up OUN members and placed them in
concentration camps (...)
The
Soviets wanted Stefan Bandera. American intelligence officials recognised that
his arrest would have quick and adverse effects of US operations with the
Ukrainians.(...)
The CIA
recognised that Bandera's extradition would be a blow to the underground
movement, but noted that his organisation 'is, as the field agrees, primarily [original emphasis] a
terrorist irgnisation".
Note that
the original CIA document reads "primarily
[original emphasis] ".
3. SVOBODA
In this
section we focus on the Ukrainian nationalist party, with its electoral base in
Western Ukraine.
3.1 Party
history
Social
National Party
Svoboda
was founded in 1991 in L’viv (Western Ukraine) as the Social-National Party of
Ukraine. According to Olszanski (10), its symbol was "the letters I+N
(Idea of
the Nation), that is graphically identical with the ‘Wolfsangel’ rune – one of
the
symbols
of European neo-Nazi organisations".
It
established in 1999 in L’viv a paramilitary organisation called Patriot of
Ukraine.
Svoboda
The Social-National
Party changed name to Svoboda in February 2004 and dropped the Wolfsangel logo
when Oleh Tyahnibok became its leader. According to Olszanski, "The
radical neo-Nazi and racist groups
were
pushed out from the party. However, Tyahnybok never concealed that these
changes were made primarily for image
purposes.
The party remains associated with the ‘wide social nationalist movement’
comprised of numerous organisations (and
websites)
and gathered around the Social- Nationalist Assembly which was set up in
2008".
Tyahnibok
Tyahnibok
(who was born in L’viv, West Ukraine) became member of the Social-National
Party in 1991 and became an MP in 1998. In 2002 he was reelected as part of the
coalition led by Yushchenko (Yushchenko became president in 2005). He was
expelled from that coalition after a speech in the summer of 2004 in which he
talked of: "the Moscow-Jewish mafia ruling our Ukraine" and
celebrated the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists for having fought " Muscovites,
Germans, Jews and other scum who wanted to take away our Ukrainian state".
Paramilitary
The
relationship between Patriot of Ukraine and Svoboda was officially ended in
2007. At the end of 2013, Patriot of Ukraine joined forces with other
nationalist groups to form the Right Sector (Pravi Sector). University of
Ottawa’s Ostriitchouk (11) wrote that Svoboda "retains close links with
far right paramilitary organisations trained to fighting, that we will see on
the front at the Maidan."
3.2
Policies
Policies
In terms
of policies, Svoboda opposes abortion and gay rights (the Kiev Post dated 11
December 2011 reads "The ultra-nationalist Svoboda Party has admitted that
their activists attacked gay community and human rights activists who were
holding a protest in central Kyiv on 8 December to commemorate international
Human Rights Day) (12), keeping and bearing arms should be allowed, Ukrainian
children should not be adopted by non-Ukrainians, ethnic origins should be
specified on passports.
Historical
narrative
Svoboda
has organised commemorations of Stepan Bandera and of the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army (UIA). They have organised marches (in L’viv) to celebrate the Waffen SS
Galicia division.
According
to Ostriitchouk, "most of the UPA monuments have been erected by Svaboda's
initiative or by Svoboda funding", and "often organise the removal of
Soviet monuments" (Lenin statues in particular are the object of another
memorial war: Svoboda sympathisers try to topple them and Communist Party
sympathisers get organised to guard them).
3.3 Views
on Svoboda
3.3.1 Jewish
organisations and Israel MPs
Wiesenthal
Centre
In 2012,
the Simon Wiesenthal Centre ranked Svoboda number 5 in its top 10 anti-semitic
list, just ahead of Greece's Golden Dawn Party.
World
Jewish Congress
In 2013
the World Jewish Congress labelled the party as "neo-nazi".
Knesset
In 2013
too, thirty MPs of the Israeli Knesset (there are 120 MPs in total) sent the
following letter to the president of the EU parliament:
"Dear
Mr. President!
First of
all, let us thank you for your activities to strengthen the values of justice
and democracy in Europe and the whole world. We want to note that Europe is a
more welcoming and tolerant place now, thanks to your initiatives and to the
spirit you bring to the continent.
However,
it has been more than half a year we receive alarming reports on the new
nationalistic trend in Ukraine stirred up by the Neo-Nazi Svoboda Party, which
won more than ten percent of votes in the last parliamentary elections. We are
aware of the threats and slander hurled by members of that party against the
Jews, the Russians, and others. These are the people who draw their inspiration
from the Nazis and openly glorify the mass murderers of the SS Ukrainian
Divisions.
We were
also shocked by the fact, that this party is not isolated at all but enjoys
full cooperation of the two main opposition parties in Ukraine. Unfortunately,
these parties did not protest at all against the actions and statements of
their extreme partner, but even have compromised themselves by their own public
glorification of Ukrainian Nazi war criminals.
We cannot
stand idly by the phenomenon of neo – Nazism in any part of the world. Our duty
is to speak out and to contact our colleagues around the world to join the
efforts and to eliminate the symptoms which take us to the darkest times of
humanity. We appreciate the strong position which the European Parliament
expressed on this issue in December last year. We also want to thank you for
the refusal of the EP to have any working relations with the Svoboda party and
for the clarification to all forces operating in Ukraine, that no attempt of
Nazism glorification will be tolerated by Europe. We hope to work together for
the better and safer future of Europe and the whole world."
3.3.2 The EU U-turn
”Racist, anti-Semite and xenophobic”
On 13
December 2012 the European Parliament adopted a text in which one paragraph
read
"Parliament
goes on to express concern about the rising nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine,
expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, is one of the
two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada [The Ukrainian parliament]. It
recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the EU's
fundamental values and principles and therefore appeals to pro-democratic parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to
associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this part.".
U-turn
Just over
a year later, the EU associated with Svoboda in the toppling of the democratically
elected government, and then backed the new coalition, of which Svoboda was the
second most important political party. When the EU signed the trade agreement
with Ukraine, Svoboda was part of the Ukrainian government.
3.4
Introducing some Svoboda MPs
Igor
Miroshnichenko
Svoboda
MP Igor Miroshnichenko is Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom
of Speech and Information. He had made news in the West in 2012 by calling
Ukrainian actress Mila Kunis a "dirty jewess".
On 19
March 2014 he made news again by storming with four others the office of the
head of National TV, Oleksandr Panteleymonov (13). They assaulted
Panteleymonov, forced him to sign a resignation letter, and abducted him for
several hours. Astonishingly, Miroshenko then posted online the video of the
assault. The message he wanted to send was clear. We do not know what happened
after this assault. On Panteleymonov Wikipedia page, it says "Acting CEO
of National Television Company of Ukraine from 20 February 2013 to 25 March
2014)." (14).
Olha
Ostriitchouk reported Tyanhibok's reaction: "If yesterday such methods
were justified (for example the take over of regional administrations and
people's pressure on high officials to sign resignation letters), today we
don't need them (other methods, legal, can be used).".
Oleg
Pankevich
From the
Nation and Foreign Policy in Focus: "Svoboda has always had a soft spot
for the [Waffen SS] Galicia Division, and one of its parliament members, Oleg
Pankevich, took part in a ceremony last April honouring the unit. Pankevich
joined with a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church near L’viv to celebrate
the unit’s seventieth anniversary and rebury some of the division’s
dead."(15).
Yuriy
Mykhalchyshyn
He was
number one of the Svoboda list for the 2010 L’viv’s municipal elections. In 2005
he established a "‘Joseph Goebbels Political Research Centre" (he
changed the name in 2008). The url was http://nachtigall88.livejournal.com (see
Olszanski's article). The number 88 refers to "Heil Hitler" in neo-Nazi
terminology (H is the 8th letter in the alphabet), and the Nachtigal battalion
was the name of one of the two Ukrainian SS divisions that sided with Nazi
Germany prior and during the June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union.
Mykhalchyshyn
has referred to the Holocaust as a "period of Light in history".
Iryna
Farion
After the
2 May 2014 Odessa massacre in which about 40 people died after a building was
set on fire, she wrote on her website "Bravo, Odessa. Pearl of Ukrainian
spirit. City of the great nationalists Ivan and Youri Lipa. Let the demons burn
in hell. Football fans are the best. Bravo."
3.5
Comments
Crimea
It is
important to realise that the presence of Svoboda in the post Yanukovych
government happened {\it before} the Russian intervention in Crimea.\\
Given
that before February 2014 Russia had shown no sign of their intention to
reunite with Crimea, we can deduce that it is the February 2014 regime change
and its new government (we will look in more details at its composition in the
next section) that triggered Russia's decision.
The
radicalisation of the Fatherland party
Svoboda
is often presented as the ultra-nationalist party, as opposed to Fatherland.
But, as said by Amar and Rudling in their article, "While Yushchenko no
longer matters, his legacy of state glorification of ethnic nationalists has
left Ukraine with one more burden to carry" , "he helped spread a
stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian nationalists", and "he
contributed to the polarization of Ukraine".
- Until
2004 and his speech, the Svoboda leader was part of the Fatherland
parliamentary faction.
- MPs
from the Timoshenko party supported the 1 January torch procession in Kiev,
marking the 103rd anniversary of Bandera (16).
- Andry
Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commander of the Maiden
armed protesters) is now a member of Fatherland.
- On 3
May 2014, the day after the Odessa massacre, MP Lesya Orobets posed pictures of
herself on facebook and twitter. She was posing with a rifle and characterised
the massacre as a "great victory" and "an adequate
response" to the pro-Russian demonstrations.
- In a
March 2014 leaked conversation (17), Tymoshenko's interlocutor said "He
asked 'What should we do now with the 8 million Russians that stayed in
Ukraine? They are outcasts!'", she allegedly replied "They must be
killed with nuclear weapons.". When the conversation was revealed, Timoshenko
said "The conversation took place, but the '8 million Russians in Ukraine'
piece is an edit. In fact, I said Russians in Ukraine – are Ukrainians.".
However, given that her interlocutor replied "I won't argue with you here,
because what happened is absolutely unacceptable", Tymoshenko's version
just does not work. This shows what the leader of the Fatherland party thinks
of the population in Eastern Ukraine.
- In June
2014, Yatseniuk (Ukrainian PM) called separatists’ backers
"subhumans" (18).
EU
nationalist political parties
Some
Western commentators have downplayed Ukrainian nationalism, comparing it to EU
far right parties such as UKIP (Farage, UK) and FN (Le Pen, France). We think
the reader of this essay will agree that Ukrainian nationalism is of a totally
different nature. Passmore (19) argues that Le Pen is not fascist (but
national-populist): "Le Pen has not attempted to use violence to lever
himself into power", "The FN does not possess a mass paramilitary
wing comparable to historical fascists".
4. EUROMAIDAN
4.1 Direct
cause of Euromaidan: the trade agreement
Here we
step back from our focus on national identities in order to introduce some
background on the trade agreement negotiations.
4.1.1
Trade agreement
Negotiations
On 21
November 2013, Yanukovych announced that he would postpone a trade agreement
with the EU. This triggered the start of the protests. On 17 December, Yanukovych
signed the trade agreement with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
During
the long negotiation process, Yanukovych had been talking to both organisations
(EU and the Russia union). Jose-Manuel Barroso said in February 2013: "one
country cannot at the same time be a member of a customs union and be in a deep
common free-trade area with the European Union".
After his
21 November decision to postpone the EU deal, Yanukovych still said he wanted a
deal that would include both the EU and Russia: on 29 November 2013 the Daily
Telegraph reported: "Yanukovych said he was now seeking a trilateral deal
which would also include Russia as a player, a notion immediately dismissed.
'When we make a bilateral deal, we don't need a trilateral agreement,' said
Barroso".
The trade
agreements
Let's
have a closer look at the the two different offers Ukraine had to choose from.
- The EU
option offered Ukraine a USD 838m loan and (together with the IMF) asked the
Ukrainian government to increase gas bills by 40% and make big budget cuts
(austerity).
- The
Russia option offered Ukraine a loan 18 times that size (USD 15bn) plus 33%
discounts on gas prices (Ukraine imports gas from Russia).
Given the
better Russia offer, and that Yanukovych had been elected as a
"pro-Russia" candidate (his party claims to defend the rights of
ethnic Russians and speakers of the Russian language in Ukraine), it is not
surprising that he decided for the Russia option.
4.1.2
Public opinion and East-West divide on the trade agreement
A 04-09 December
2013 KIIS poll (20) said that 48% of Ukrainians thought Yanukovych had been
right not to sign the EU trade agreement. 35% thought he had been wrong.
82% of
Western Ukrainians were in favour of signing the EU trade agreement, and 18% of
Eastern Ukrainans supported the EU agreement.
4.2 A
Western backed revolution
4.2.1 EU
and US leaders
Since our
focus is on national identities, we do not want to spend too much time on
Western support for the Euromaidan and the government that came out of it.
John
McCain, Victoria Nuland, Cathryn Ashton and others went to Kiev and basically
participated in the revolution.
One could
debate about their exact responsibility in the revolution, we do not want to
discuss this here. It is sufficient to say that they actively supported it.
4.2.2 The
Ukrainian diaspora
Amar and
Rudling wrote:
"Last
but not least, a significant section of the Ukrainian diaspora abroad, have too
often reflexively taken a right-or-wrong-our-freedom-fighters approach to
wartime and post-war ethnic nationalists.(...)
Some émigré
scholars selectively omitted compromising statements from nationalist
pronouncements. In some cases the OUN's deliberate forgeries have been
circulated as authentic evidence to refute allegations of anti-Semitism. One of
these consisted of an autobiography of a fictitious Jewish woman, Stella
Krentsbakh or Kreutzbach, titled "I am Alive thanks to the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army," presented as "evidence" to "disprove"
any and all genuine survivor testimony to nationalist anti-Semitism.A similar
tactic has been used, with Yushchenko’s direct involvement, to deny nationalist
involvement in pogroms in 1941. A popular rhetorical strategy to counter
scholars querying nationalist narratives has been to implicitly or explicitly,
publicly or more quietly denounce them as "neo-Soviet," deceived by
or pandering to former Soviet or current Russian propaganda.(...)"
Ostriitchouk
wrote:
"The
Ukrainian diaspora is an actor too important to be ignored, as is shown by the
many pro-Maidan actions (including financial backing), the debates it started
in Canada and the US, the way it influences their foreign policies and watches
all public interventions.
This
direct and long dated implication on Ukrainian politics is explained, amongst
other things, by the fact that the most active part of the diaspora comes from
the third wave of immigration of the 1950s, which was essentially made of
Western Ukrainians and actors of the nationalist struggle, strongly opposed to
the communist regime."
4.3 A
West Ukrainian revolution
Because
of our focus on national identities, we are not going to document the violence.
We still should say that according to Ostriitchouk, violence took place on both
sides. Also, it is far from sure that Yanukovych gave the orders to the snipers
(see Paet Ashton leaked conversation, and the investigation by the German TV
channel ARD)
Right
Sector
The
paramilitary organisation Right Sector was founded in November 2013 (note that
it was formed early in the Euromaidan timeline) as a coalition of different
ultranationalist groups and was one of the main actors of the violent stages.
Many people had come to Kiev from the L’viv region (and other regions, mainly
from the West) in December or January.
On 21
January, Alec Luhn (21) wrote in The Nation (22)
"Spearheading the clashes with police was Right Sector, a group with ties
to far-right parties including the Patriots of Ukraine and Trident, which BBC
Ukraine reported is largely comprised of nationalist football fans. In a
statement the next day, the group claimed credit for Sunday’s unrest and
promised to continue fighting until President Viktor Yanukovych stepped
down."
Ukraine
above all
Alec
Luhn: "Svoboda is the most visible party on the square, it has essentially
taken over Kiev City Hall as its base of operations, and it has a large
influence in the protestors’ security forces.
It also
has revived three slogans originating in the Ukrainian nationalist movement of
the 1930s [the UIA] that have become the most popular chants at Euromaidan.
Almost all speakers on Independence Square—even boxer-turned-opposition-leader
Vitaly Klitschko, who has lived mostly in Germany and has a US residence
permit—start and end with the slogan, “Glory to Ukraine!,” to which the crowd
responds “To heroes glory!” Two other nationalist call-and-response slogans
often heard on the square are “Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!” and
“Ukraine above all!”".
Other
nationalist symbolic
Ostriitchouk:
"For those who wanted to see and listen, the ultranationalist symbolic of
Maidan had quickly supplanted and marginalised the EU's symbolic. At the
beginning of the rallies, the red and black flags of Bandera were on Maidan
next to other flags of the far right like the ones of Svoboda, KUN, UNA-UNSO,
Bandera's trident and Patriot of Ukraine. The large poster of Bandera was put
at Kiev's city hall as soon as the protesters took control of it. Later, the
funerals of the first dead took place among those flags".
Memorial
dates
Ostriitchouk:
"All commemorative dates going in that direction [threat of Russian
imperialism, or indeed Soviet] and falling during Euromaidan were exploited to
feed popular anger, starting with the 80th anniversary of Holodomor, followed
closely by the celebration of the Orange revolution, to the 200th anniversary
of Taras Chevtchenko, but with also the 105th anniversary of Bandera, the
memorial pilgrimage on the battlefield of the heroes of Kruty who died in the
struggle against the Bolsheviks defending the young Ukrainian nation on 29
January 1918."
Pro EU or
anti-Russian?
In the
same article, Alec Luhn describes Svaboda's tactics: "How can the slogan
'Ukraine above all!' sound on Independence Square alongside the slogan 'Ukraine
in the EU!', Ukrainian progressive activist Olga Papash asked in a recent piece
on the politics and culture website Korydor. (...) Even Yury Noyevy, a member
of Svoboda's political council, admitted that the party is only pro-EU because
it is anti-Russia."
4.3.1
Public opinion and East-West divide on EuroMaidan
A 04-09
December 2013 poll (23) said 49% supported Euromaidan, and 45% didn't support
it.
But what
was interesting was that the country was geographically divided: 84% in the
West of Ukraine supported it (against 11%), 66% in the Centre supported it
(against 27%), 33% in the South supported it (against 60%), and only 13% in the
East supported it (against 81%).
5. WHAT CAME OUT OF EUROMAIDAN
5.1 The
post Yanukovych government
Let's
move on to the coalition government, after Yanukovych fled Kiev. The PM was
Fatherland's Yatseniuk (he had done 6.96% in the 2010 presidential elections),
and the rest of the government was made of:
- 6
members of Fatherland.
- 4
members of Svoboda (Oleksandr Sych as vice PM, Ihor Tenyukh, Andrei Mokhnyk,
Ihor Shvaika, ).
- (Serhiy
Kvit, Minister of Education and Science) member of the far-right Ukrainian
paramilitary organisation the Stepan Bandera Tryzub (this organisation is one
of the founding organisations of Right Sector).
- 4
people from L’viv with unclear affiliation (the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Finance, Health, Economy).
- 2
Euromaiden activists (the Euromaiden podium presenter became Minister of
Culture, another one became Minister of Youth and Sports)
- 1
former minister under the former Timoshenko government (before 2010).
5.2 Focus
on Kvit, the new Minister of Education and Science
Let's
quote Amar and Rudling:
"
What is worrying at this moment and has, unfortunately, come to be linked to
the Maidan Revolution is that several key promoters of nationalist memory
politics have come into high office. Thus, Serhy Kvit, head of Kyiv Mohyla
Academy, Ukraine's most prestigious university, is now the Minister of
Education. Kvit insists that the nationalists of WW2 can serve as examples for
today's Ukraine, demanding that this should be strictly separated from what he
considers Russian propaganda. He is the author of an admiring biography of
Dmytro Dontsov, one of the key theoreticians of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.
It denies and rationalizes Dontsov's anti-Semitism and marginalizes his
enthusiasm for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. It also denounces John-Paul
Himka as one of the leaders of an "academic Internationale of
Ukrainophobes." Such statements show that nationalist memory production
deliberately cuts itself off from up-to-date international scholarship, in
particular on the role of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism in the Holocaust.(...)
Kvit has
also participated in robustly nationalist public activism, promoting Dontsovian
ideology through the "Dmytro Dontsov Research-Ideological Center." In
the 1990s Kvit was a member of the Presidium of the Congress of Ukrainian
Nationalists and the organization "Tryzub imeni Bandery," a wing of
KUN which split from the party in 2000. He is open about the fact that he does
not regard Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the "Right Sector" as an
extremist".
5.3 Let's
have a look at other nominations that took place
- Oleh
Mahnitsky (Svoboda MP) was named General Prosecutor.
- Tatiana
Chornovol (member since aged 17 of the UNA-UNS organisation, a far right organisation
of which the political wing merged with Right Sector in May 2014) was appointed
head of Ukrainian government's National Anti-Corruption Committee on 5 March
2014.
- Andry
Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commander of the
Maiden armed protesters) became head of the National Security and Defense
Council on 27 February 2014.
- Egor
Sobolev became head of the new lustration committee. "He said in
interviews that the goal of the lustration la will be to ban Yanukovych and his
closest allies from politic for life" (24). The Svoboda bill mentioned in
the article "that public servants at all levels, as well as applicants for
state jobs will have to undergo a screening procedure. Those who fail the
screening will be dismissed from their positions.". We don't know if the
bill was passed.
- On 2
March 2014, new governors were named in the following regions: in the Dnipropetrovsk
region the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky (second or third richest man in Ukraine,
337th richest person in the world according to Forbes 2011), in the Donetsk
region the oligarch Sergei Taruta (billionaire in dollars too).
5.4
Comments
The new
government in short
The new
government had no representative of the Party of Regions, it was a coalition Fatherland
c+ Svoboda + people from L’viv +
Euromaidan activists. There was no representative from the East of Ukraine.
The first
day of the new government
On 23
February 2014, only the day after Yanukovych fled Kiev, with no debate, the
parliament voted to remove Russian as a second official language (a week later,
probably because of Western advice, the interim president vetoed it).
We ask
the reader to step back and reflect. Even if the law was later vetoed, the fact
that on the very first day it is this that they wanted to do is enough to
understand the nature of this government.
5.5
Elections
Polls at
the end of January 2014
The last
polls that were made with Yanukovych in them were made in the period 24 January
- 1 February 2014 (25). He was top of the polls with 29.2%. Second was boxer
turned politician Klitschko (22.8%), then Timoshenko (19.1%) and Poroshenko's
rise had already started (15.9%).
After
Yanukovich's ousting, the Party of Regions, representing the South and the East
of Ukraine, disintegrated.
5.5.1 Election
of Poroshenko
Poroshenko
The oligarch
Poroshenko was elected in the first round of the elections with 54.7%.
Svoboda
Svoboda
did a low national score, but as we saw before (low score at 2010 presidential
elections followed by very high scores at the 2010 local elections), it seems
that Svoboda sympathisers prefer to vote for the closest popular candidate at
presidential elections.
It is
also crucial to notice that Poroshenko has kept the same government. All the
new jobs (in government and outside government) gained by Svoboda at the end of
February 2014 were kept. The presence of Svoboda in the government was not
temporary. Its presence in the government is based on a coalition between close
political parties.
Lyashko
It is
also worth mentioning the relatively high score (8.32%) of Oleh Lyashko, the
candidate for the Radical Party. During the Crimea crisis he tried pass (but
failed) to pass a bill in parliament that would give death penalty to
separatists. Later he took matters into his own hands. On 23 May the Kiev Post
reported "Paramilitaries from a group organized by presidential candidate
Oleh Lyashko stormed a local government building in a sleepy eastern Ukrainian
mining city and killed a pro-Russian separatist while maiming another in a
gangland-style shooting on May 23. One man was shot in the head and abdomen,
while a second man sustained three gunshot wounds to his neck and abdomen and
was fighting for his life in a nearby hospital after the attack." (26).
5.5.2 Ukraine
still divided
Poroshenko's
total number of votes was 9,857,308. In the 2nd round of the 2010 elections,
Yanukovich's number of votes was 12,481,266, and Tymoshenko's was 11,593,357.
Turnout
The
turnout was much higher in the West of Ukraine (and in the Centre), than in the
South and in the East (see turnout electoral map at the end, as well as the map
of turnout differences between 2014 and 2010). In the Donbass most people just
couldn't vote.
Odessa
2010 and 2014
We have
picked a random district of Odessa (the first Odessa district, district 135)
(27). In the first round of the 2010
elections, there were 65.7% valid ballots. Yanukovych got 44.6% in the first
round, i.e. 53,978 votes. In the 2010 elections, there were only 48.9% valid
ballots. The 42.8% obtained by Poroshenko represented 36,563 votes.
Now, in
the 2nd round of the 2010 elections, participation was stable and Yanukovych
got 87,807 votes (74.4%), which is more than the total number of people who
(validly) voted in 2010! (the total number of valid votes was 85,372)
Earlier
referendums
Here we
should also mention the other referendums that took place after Euromaidan:
-
Crimeans voted for joining Russia in March 2014 . The referendum was organised
by Crimeans and Russians against the will of the Ukrainian government. While
some contest the figures, we are not aware of anybody contesting that a
majority of Crimeans wanted to be part of Russia. A Pew Research poll (April 2014)
showed that 92% of Crimeans think that Russia is playing a positive role in
Crimea, and 2% think that the US are having a good influence on the way things
are going in Crimea.
- People in the
Donbass voted for independence in early May 2014. This referendum was organised
by separatists. Polls organised on the day of the referendum by Western
journalists, as well as the reporting of journalists on the ground tend to show
that a large majority wanted separation (for completion: according to a LA
Times article "Opinion polls conducted in April by both foreign and
domestic agencies showed a sizable majority - at least 70% even in the eastern
regions - opposed to secession from Ukraine or union with Russia. But the
recent violence has turned many against the Kiev government", "Scores
of deaths during confrontations in Odessa on May 2 and in Mariupol on Friday
appear to have spurred the massive turnout Sunday", "there were huge
queues of people, almost all of whom said they were voting yes to
separatism." (28), note also that in the Donbass people are more likely to
be for separation than in other parts of Eastern Ukraine, and that the Pew
April poll also showed that 67% of East Ukrainians had a negative opinion of
the new coalition).
Again, to
those who sympathised with Ukrainians who went to the street during Euromaidan
because they were fed up with corruption, with bad governance, or who wanted
closer ties with the EU, we ask them to look at the composition of the
government, to the first thing they tried to do as they came into power, and to
the nominations that were made shortly after the formation of the Yatsenyuk
government.
CONCLUSION
National
identities
We have
highlighted and documented the strong correlation between: geographical
location in Ukraine, political support, and national identity. In particular we
have highlighted the two poles: Western Ukraine (Ukrainian nationalism, strong
popularity of Bandera, anti Soviet and anti Russian feelings), and the Donbass
region (Soviet identity, sympathy for Russia, Bandera seen as an enemy). The
South and the rest of the East are closer to the Donbass, while the Centre is
closer to Western Ukraine.
Polarisation
As Amar
and Rudling wrote, "Yushchenko's legacy of state glorification of ethnic
nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry", "he
helped spread a stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian
nationalists", and "he contributed to the polarization of
Ukraine".
Euromaidan
As
Ostriitchouk wrote, "The Maidan revolution is firstly a product of Western
Ukraine, of a nationalist Ukrainian an West and of its Western backers, among
which the Ukrainian diaspora is too important a factor to be ignored.".
Poroshenko
election
By
looking in details at the 2014 election results, we have seen that Proshenko's
election in the first round was not due to him being a unifying figure, but to
the fact that many Ukrainians in the South and in the East stayed home (the
Party of Regions had disintegrated). We looked in details at the Odessa results
(district 135) and found that the total number of people who went to vote in
2014 was smaller than the number of people who voted for Yanukovych in 2010.
Ukraine
We have
shown that the new government represents West Ukraine nationalism, and that
this nationalism is a strong divisive factor in Ukraine. Given the
disintegration of the political party representing South and East Ukrainians,
and the measures taken by the new government (e.g. the new lustration
committee), we are pessimistic for Ukraine, and non-nationalist Ukrainians.
Ostriitchouk talks of a "witch hunt" against those who were connected
(closely or remotely) to Yanukovych (how far would it be extended to East and
South Ukrainians?) and of a will to ban political opposition (Svoboda want to
ban the Communist Party).
EU and US
The reason why the
EU and the US have backed this revolution and this new government (part of it
described by the EU as xenophobic in 2012) cannot be known for sure - we can
only speculate. It is of course not impossible that the support given by the US
and the EU to the new Ukrainian government is due to blindness.
Emmanuel Todd's
original hypothesis is that the US have lost control of Germany, and that it is
Germany that led the West into this (the US didn't want to show public
disagreements with Germany).
We think
it is more likely that the West's decision to support Ukrainian nationalists
was US led, and that it was based on what they thought was in their best
interest, which they think has to be (because of old cold war thinking?)
opposite to Russia's interest. As Hudson wrote "the aim of a Ukrainian
anti-Russian turn thus is not to help Ukraine, but to use that unfortunate
country as a pawn in the New Cold War. As Hudson wrote "the aim of a Ukrainian
anti-Russian turn thus is not to help Ukraine, but to use that unfortunate
country as a pawn in the New Cold War." (29).
Historical
parallel 1
We cannot
help but remember the Soviet-Afghan war, in which the US supported Mujahideens,
and in the process created Al Qaeda. In the Ukrainian situation there was no
war though.
Historical
parallel 2
From the
Ukrainian nationalists' point of view, a parallel can be drawn with their
predecessors in WW2. In WW2 they sided with Germany in order to fight against
the Soviets (and the Poles). Today's nationalists have sided with the EU and
the US to make sure Ukraine has no link with Russia economically, to drive away
East Ukrainians from power, and to put in place their nationalist agenda.
Again, in the 2014 situation, there was no occupation, Ukraine was an
independent state.
Historical
parallel 3
The last
parallel is simply between the US and Ukrainian nationalists just after WW2, as
mentioned earlier in our essay. The CIA described then Bandera's organisation
as "terrorist". Less than seventy years later, the US (and the EU)
had no moral issue backing the heirs of Bandera in Ukraine. And had no moral
issue eithers when these heirs called "terrorists" (30) East
Ukrainians who refused to be part of the new nationalist Ukraine, or when the
Ukrainian PM called people supporting the separatists "subhumans"
(31).
Antony Penaud
1. See The Politics of WW2 in Contemporary Ukraine,
available on the internet.
8. See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIA's
relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIA declassified document.
9. See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIA's
relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIA declassified document.
10.
Svoboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene by Tadeusz
Olszanski in issue 56 of the Centre for Eastern Studies (04 July 2011).
14 On 28
April 2014, the mayor of Kharkov Gennady Kernes was shot while cycling. The
Guardian's Luke Harding wrote "Kharkiv journalist Zurab Alasania blamed
Russia for Monday's shooting. He noted in a Facebook post that the mayor had
not changed his routine of going for a morning lake swim, despite the
deteriorating security situation in the East. 'The Russian Federation is
identifying and liquidating key centres of resistance,' Alasania said.".
The reader was led to think that Zurab Alasania was an independent local
journalist. In fact he was the pro-Maiden journalist who replaced Panteleymonov
as head of National Television.
18 He
said "killed by invaders and sponsored by subhumans", see http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp_t1
19
Fascism, a very short introduction
21 Young
American journalist Alec Luhn writes mainly for The Guardian and The Nation. He
is based in Moscow but has spent many of the last few months in Ukraine
25 See
Wikipedia, the 2014 presidential Ukraine elections.
27 See
http://electionresources.org/ua/president.php?election=2010$\&$district=135
29
See Michael Hudson, The New Cold War's Ukraine Gambit.
30
The Ukrainian government call ATO (anti terrorist operation) the civil war in
the Donbass.
31
He referred to the separatists’ sponsors (did he refer to Russians or East
Ukrainians?) http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp_t1
.JPG)
.JPG)
.JPG)
.JPG)
.JPG)
.JPG){kind=link}